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THE HUMAN RIGHTS POTENTIAL OF SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS
PATRICK J. KEENAN* & CHRISTIANA OCHOA**
When World Bank president Robert Zoellick called for sovereign
wealth funds to invest one percent of their capital in Africa,1 he was
expressing what has become the conventional wisdom in two distinct
ways. First, many scholars and policymakers have come to believe that
poor countries are better served by private investment than traditional
public development assistance.2 For example, in 2006 private capital
displaced official development assistance as the dominant source of
finance for African states, and all indications demonstrate that states
are unlikely to significantly increase official development assistance in
the near future.3 Indeed, Zoellick’s suggestion echoed a similar call
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1. Robert Zoellick, President, World Bank Group, A Challenge of Economic Statecraft,
Address at the Center for Global Development (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://go.worldbank.org/
KRFPZ4OU30.
2. See Chris Bryant, IFC Looks to Wealth Funds for African Assistance, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008,
at 8 (“Private capital flows in 2006 overtook official aid as the main source of external finance for
sub-Saharan African countries, quadrupling to $48bn between 2000 and 2006, compared with
$40bn in official aid flows.”).
3. While aid, especially for uses other than debt relief is increasing slightly, and increasing at
a slightly higher rate for sub-Saharan African countries than for others, many countries have
decreased their development assistance in recent years and the OECD has expressed concern that
donor countries are not planning to fulfill their development aid commitments. See, e.g., Eckhard
Deutscher, Chairman, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Dev. Assistance Comm.,
Remarks at a Press Conference (Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/37/
0,3343,en_2649_33721_40385189_1_1_1_1,00.html (indicating that aid to sub-Saharan Africa is
increasing at a faster rate than aid to other places); STATISTICS AND MONITORING DIVISION, OECD
DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE, DEBT RELIEF IS DOWN: OTHER ODA RISES SLIGHTLY
(2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/55/40381862.pdf (indicating that a
number of states have decreased their total development assistance and that non-debt relief
increased slightly); Angel Gurrı´a, Secretary-General, OECD, ‘We Must Do Better:’ Trends in
Development Assistance, Remarks (Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/7/
0,3343,en_2649_34487_40385351_1_1_1_1,00.html (imploring countries to redouble their aid
donations).
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from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.4
The second way that Zoellick’s call reflected the conventional wis-
dom is the implicit assumption that a large infusion of wealth would
benefit the people of Africa. If wealthy countries were to heed Zoel-
lick’s call, there would be an influx of up to $30 billion in new equity
investment in Africa.5 At first blush, this might appear to be a pure
benefit likely to lead to economic growth and improvement in the
welfare of people located in the world’s poorest countries. But history
has shown that infusions of wealth from wealthy countries to develop-
ing countries have not had their intended effect. For example, states
that receive substantial revenue from the sale of natural resources like
oil, gas, or minerals have often fared worse than similar states without
such resources.6 In many countries, development assistance has had
very little impact on economic growth and many of the biggest recipi-
ents of foreign aid are less well off now than they were two generations
ago.7 There are compelling reasons to be skeptical over whether
increased investment in Africa by sovereign funds promoted by Zoel-
lick, even if heeded, will do much good, and some reasons to think that
such investment might actually do harm.
In this Article we propose a mechanism designed to increase the
likelihood that greater sovereign investment in Africa will actually
benefit the citizens of recipient states. We take as our starting point an
important facet of Zoellick’s proposal. He suggested that one-percent
of investments from sovereign wealth funds be channeled through the
International Finance Corporation,8 the branch of the World Bank
responsible for private sector investment in the service of the World
Bank’s mission of reducing poverty.9 Zoellick argued that the IFC’s
“access, knowledge, and capital” could “help other investors over the
4. See JAVIER SANTISO, BANKING ON DEVELOPMENT: PRIVATE FINANCIAL ACTORS AND DONORS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/4/40265826.pdf.
5. See Steven R. Weisman, World Bank Calls on Sovereign Funds to Invest in Africa, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2008, at A8.
6. See generally Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 WORLD POL. 297
(1999).
7. See generallyWORLD BANK, ASSESSING AID: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T, AND WHY (1998).
8. See Zoellick, supra note 1.
9. The World Bank Group comprises the International Finance Corporation, the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association,
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes. All five entities share a mission of reducing poverty, but they address
different development challenges. See generally www.worldbankgroup.org.
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initial hurdles of investing in new equity opportunities in Africa.”10
Toward this end the IFC announced in December 2008 that it would
create a “Sovereign Funds Initiative” to enable the IFC “to raise and
manage commercial capital from sovereign funds for equity invest-
ments in some of the poorest developing countries.”11 The IFC has not
yet released details about the new initiative, but it is at least an
indication that the IFC is attempting to put Zoellick’s words into action.
The IFC has an extensive record of investing in Africa and providing
advisory services for private investors,12 which suggests that the IFC
could add value to the investments of others by, for example, helping to
identify viable projects or avoid untrustworthy partners. But the real
potential of the Sovereign Funds Initiative to do good (or harm)
depends in part on how it shapes the incentives and constraints facing
the recipients of its investments.
Zoellick’s proposal and the nascent Sovereign Funds Initiative have
the potential to provide real benefits to poor people in Africa if
structured appropriately, but must first resolve an important and
difficult problem: additional wealth can reduce welfare. To describe
this problem we use the term unconditioned wealth, by which we mean
wealth owned or obtained by states unaccompanied by strong political
or market conditions.13 Examples include the massive influx of invest-
ments from China into Africa, typically free of social or political
conditions, windfall revenues from the sale of natural resources, and
development assistance delivered without meaningful oversight or
attention to the uses its recipients make of it.14 Without such condi-
tions, wealth—whether in the form of revenue from the sale of natural
resources, development assistance, or sovereign wealth funds—can be
used in ways that either do not meaningfully contribute to economic
10. Zoellick, supra note 1.
11. Press Release, Int’l Fin. Corp. [IFC], IFC Board Approves Initiatives for Financial Crisis
Response and Sovereign Funds to Support Private Sector in Emerging Markets (Dec. 18, 2008),
available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/media.nsf/content/SelectedPressRelease?OpenDocument
&UNIDE915A6E933FD599E85257523007974CD.
12. See generally IFC, IFC ANNUAL REPORT 2007: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, available at http://www.
ifc.org/ifcext/annualreport.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/AR2007_v1_Regions/$FILE/AR2007_
Regions.pdf (describing the IFC’s work in Africa).
13. For the complete version of this argument, see Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China,
Africa, and The Effects of Unconditioned Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 83 (2009). In this Article, we
sketch out the broad outlines of this argument in Part I.A, infra.
14. As we explain in Part III.A, infra, when we discuss “conditions,” we are not advocating a
return to the IMF’s policy of conditionality or anything similar. Instead, we use the term to
describe the various incentives and conditions associated with all wealth.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS POTENTIAL OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
2009] 1153
development or that actually reduce social welfare.15
In this Article, we propose that the World Bank transforms its
Sovereign Funds Initiative into what we will call the “Multilateral
Sovereign Investment Agency” (MSIA). The MSIA would be an invest-
ment vehicle through which sovereign funds would channel at least a
portion of their assets under management. The management would
then use these funds to make equity investments in enterprises in
Africa. Our objective in proposing the MSIA is to learn from history.
African states have received influxes of wealth many times before, but
this wealth has not produced meaningful economic development or
improved the lives of ordinary people. If the World Bank’s new
program is structured in a way that reflects the best available understand-
ing of why previous influxes of wealth have done so little good, it has
the potential to be ameaningful development tool and not just another
abortive attempt to increase the amount of wealth flowing into Africa
without considering the effects of that wealth on the welfare of people
living in recipient states.
In Part I of this Article we situate our proposal in a broader
theoretical framework. We show that infusions of wealth have not
significantly contributed to economic development. To do this we rely
on recent econometric studies of the efficacy of development assistance
and the history of resource-dependent economies to show that trans-
fers of wealth, standing alone, have not sparked economic develop-
ment or enhanced welfare. After surveying the evidence, we show why
wealth transfers have been ineffective: those transfers have not gener-
ated the incentives necessary to ensure that newly-attained wealth is
used to benefit ordinary citizens rather than support the regime that
happens to be in power. Resource wealth, development assistance, and,
increasingly, investments from sovereign funds can all suffer from this
malady. Wealth, regardless of the source, is unlikely to benefit citizens
unless someone has the capacity to hold the managers of the wealth
accountable if they waste or steal it. This accountability can come from
an engaged citizenry that votes out of office politicians who mismanage
the economy, or from financial markets that reward well-managed
firms and punish those who are poor stewards of shareholder invest-
ment. Although this is not a new problem, the conventional ap-
proaches to managing it are inadequate because they assume a model
of state decision-making that is inconsistent with the capacity, function-
ality, and will of many developing states. Many of the states most in
15. See Keenan, supra note 13, at 103-09.
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need of development assistance or foreign investment simply do not
adequately fulfill their legal duty to protect human rights, are led by
unaccountable rulers, and have economies in which transparency is
rare and corruption is common.16 To fill this gap, we argue that,
especially in the case of fragile or dysfunctional states, the protections
to which citizens are entitled can be provided through transnational
mechanisms designed to mitigate the problems associated with invest-
ment in these locations. Our proposed MSIA is an attempt to fashion a
real-world solution, based on the best available research on wealth and
developing states, to the problems that can come from investment in
places where regimes use wealth to protect themselves, not enhance
the lives of their citizens.
In Part II we describe our proposal in more detail. We argue that the
MSIA could be created within the existing framework of the World
Bank Group and sketch the broad outlines of MSIA. We deliberately do
not attempt to specify every detail of the proposed new entity. Such
operational details are certainly important, but must flow from the
institution’s theoretical framework rather than precede it. Many of our
institutional design principles are drawn from the venture capital
literature. Venture capital firms receive funds from outside investors
and then invest those funds in very early stage businesses.17 The
venture capital market has evolved in such a way as to efficiently link
capital with promising entrepreneurs.18 We draw on this literature to
better understand three main issues: the importance of actively seeking
investment opportunities rather than passively awaiting applications,
the need for investors to provide management assistance in addition to
financial capital, and the potential for investors to help encourage
ethical practices and compliance with the law. The venture capital
model is useful primarily because it demonstrates how institutional
design features can manage the incentives and interests of outside
16. See generally WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2009, available at http://www.doingbusiness.
org/Documents/FullReport/2009/DB_2009_English.pdf; Transparency International, Promoting
Good Governance in Africa, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2009/promoting_
good_governance_in_africa; JOHN RUGGIE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES (2008), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf.
17. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (2003) (describing the typical structure of the venture
capital market).
18. See Robert D. Cooter, Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 373, 375-77 (2005) (describing the process and importance of connecting innovation and
capital).
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investors, fund managers, and portfolio companies in a way that can
produce wealth for all.
In Part III we consider ways to implement our proposal and antici-
pate several possible complications or objections. Although there are
many possible objections, we focus on three: that our proposal amounts
to a return to ineffective and offensive conditionality; that our proposal
does not account for the history of exploitation and abuse associated
with corporate activity in Africa; and that our proposal is simply
implausible.
Separate and apart from the roadmap provided above, a couple of
brief clarifications and a statement of our normative premises are in
order before moving on. First, sovereign funds19 are asset management
vehicles that invest public funds. In contrast to currency reserves, which
are typically managed by central banks with the objective of ensuring
liquidity and the stability of the country’s currency, sovereign funds are
investment vehicles that permit states to seek higher returns by taking
on higher risks. Although their rules vary widely, sovereign funds can
invest in securities, property, commodities, and private equity. Sover-
eign funds are funded by a variety of sources, including fiscal surpluses,
foreign reserves, and revenue from the sale of commodities such as oil
or natural gas. Although it is impossible to be certain because sovereign
funds are largely unregulated, most observers estimate that sovereign
funds manage between $2 and $3 trillion in assets.20
There are two normative propositions on which our proposal is
premised that we make explicit here. The first is that the objective of
both development assistance and private investment should be to
enhance the welfare of ordinary people. This is not to suggest that the
motivations for charity and investment are or ought to be identical.
Instead, we maintain that charity and private investment should aim to
benefit citizens, not the regime that happens to be in power. Just as
development assistance is designed to benefit citizens, so too should
19. We use the terms “sovereign funds” instead of the more conventional “sovereign wealth
funds” to parallel the language used by the World Bank in its policy statement regarding the
Sovereign Funds Initiative.
20. See INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF], SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS—A WORK AGENDA 7 (2008),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf (estimating that sover-
eign funds manage assets worth between $2.093 trillion and $2.968 trillion). It is, of course, likely
that sovereign funds have suffered along with all other investors in the current economic crisis.
For an analysis of the likely effect of the crisis on some sovereign funds, see Brad Setser & Rachel
Ziemba, GCC Sovereign Funds: Reversal of Fortune (Council on Foreign Relations, Working Paper,
2009) (estimating that the value of sovereign funds controlled by Persian Gulf states fell “from
almost $1.3 trillion in 2007 to $1.2 trillion in 2008”).
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the sale of oil or the creation of an export processing zone, for exam-
ple, benefit the people in whose names the action is taken. The second
normative proposition is that the state duty to protect citizens from
human rights violations can be shared.21 That is, when an individual
state is incapable of protecting its citizens, other states (such as those
states benefiting from trade with dysfunctional states) or groupings of
states acting through international institutions should fulfill the duty to
protect. Because this second proposition is perhaps themore controver-
sial, we devote the rest of this Part to showing why it is appropriate.
The emergence of the international human rights regime has shifted
previous fundamental understandings regarding state sovereignty. Sov-
ereignty is itself now conditioned on a state’s ability and will to protect
the human rights of its citizens.22 The human rights regime seeks to
protect individuals from violations of their rights, regardless of whether
those rights have been violated by agents of the state or by private
actors.23 When a state fails to protect its citizens from violations of
human rights and fails to sanction violations, the state itself has been
held to have breached its duty to protect human rights.24
Not all states have the capacity or the will to protect human rights
and may make very little real effort to fulfill this duty. This is particu-
larly evident in failed and failing states, but it is also an all too common
phenomenon in states engaged in long-running conflicts, in states that
have authoritarian governments, and in states that have too few re-
sources to give full effect to their efforts to protect human rights. In all
of these cases, the ultimate subjects of the human rights regime suffer
as a result of the state’s failings.
When a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its duty to protect human
rights, the result should not be that the citizens of that states simply
must suffer their bad fortune of having been born in the wrong place.
In these cases, the international community—other states and interna-
tional institutions—have often shared in fulfilling the duty to protect
human rights. The United Nations human rights system, the regional
human rights bodies and relatively new creations such as the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Tribunal
21. See RUGGIE, supra note 16.
22. See Vesselin Popovski, Essay: Sovereignty as a Duty to Protect Human Rights, UN CHRONICLE
ONLINE EDITION (2004), http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue4/0404p16.html.
23. THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 46 (2002).
24. Id.
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for Rwanda (ICTR) present examples of the international community
recognizing that protecting a particular state’s citizens often requires
concerted action by entities outside of that state.
There has been less recognition of this duty to share in the protec-
tion of human rights in the areas of business and finance. The recent
Report of the Special Representative to the Secretary General on the
issue of business and human rights, for example, takes a fairly tradi-
tional position, asserting only that it is a state’s duty to protect human
rights.25 A strong reliance on the state’s duties will not function
effectively in the context of a recalcitrant state. In these situations,
states, private actors, and international institutions should share the
duty to protect those rights that are violated in connection with
business and financial activity.
However, merely asserting a shared duty to protect is not enough.
Instead, we propose concrete measures for knowing when other states,
private actors, and international institutions will bear such duties. We
propose a fairly bright line: when states and investors knowingly engage
with host states that are unable to protect their own citizens against
harms that may be committed or facilitated by the investment, they
undertake to share this duty with the host state.26 In short, arrange-
ments that result in investors benefiting from the dysfunctional nature
of host states should give rise to the investor’s obligation to share in the
duty to protect human rights.
Similarly, when international organizations provide countries with
development aid, loans, or other grants, they also join in the duty to
protect, especially to the extent that their own activities may negatively
affect growth in their target-country. It is unacceptable that interna-
tional organizational involvement can lead to negative growth. The
best available evidence demonstrates this effect and suggests the devel-
opment of policies that mitigate harm associated with involvement of
international organizations.
25. See RUGGIE, supra note 16, at 9-20.
26. There are a number of indicators now available for determining whether a particular
host-state suffers from the failures that would give rise to sharing the duty to protect. See, e.g., FAFO
INSTITUTE, RED FLAGS: LIABILITY RISKS FOR COMPANIES OPERATING IN HIGH-RISK ZONES, available at
http://www.redflags.info/index.php?page_id14&style_id0; OECD, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES AND SITUATIONS (2007), available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf.
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I. THE PROBLEM: MANAGING THE FRONTIER OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
GOVERNANCE, AND FINANCE
If wealthy countries actually follow Zoellick’s call, $30 billion in new
equity investments would not be the first influx of wealth into African
states. For example, the sale of oil or other natural resources in the past
five years has generated enormous revenue for a number of African
states. Furthermore, many African states have long received substantial
official development assistance and country-to-country loans. Unfortu-
nately, the available evidence shows that the infusion of wealth has had
relatively little effect on the welfare of ordinary people. Because we
conceive of the MSIA as an attempt to address these specific problems,
we first describe them with some particularity, including an analysis of
their causes and consequences. Then, in Part II, we argue that the
World Bank must structure its proposed initiative so as to mitigate or
eliminate the problems we have identified. The rapid ascendance of
sovereign funds suggests to us, as it has to the World Bank, their great
potential to contribute possibly useful resources to very poor countries.
But this potential will only be realized if the wealth they contribute
includes coordinated, state-of-the-art good practices tailored to the
observed behaviors of typical recipient states. The novelty of sovereign
funds and the proposed MSIA also opens the possibility of incorporat-
ing innovative investment channels coupled with constraints and incen-
tives, including explicit transparency requirements,27 anti-corruption
regulations and monitoring,28 and measures that incorporate the latest
research regarding the human rights duties and responsibilities of
states and private actors.29
The observation that more wealth can reduce welfare has vexed
scholars and policymakers alike. States with abundant natural re-
sources often develop much more slowly than do states with less
abundant resources.30 Conventional economic theory suggests that
27. See, e.g., KARIN ALEXANDER & STEFAN GILBERT, OIL AND GOVERNANCE REPORT: A CASE STUDY
OF CHAD, ANGOLA, GABON, AND SAO TOME E PRINCIPE (2008), available at http://www.eitransparency.
org/files/publication_file/Oil_and_Governance_Report_March_2008.pdf.
28. One example of this is the adoption of legislation similar to the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. To date, only
thirty-seven countries are signatories to this Convention. See OECD, OECD CONVENTION ON COMBAT-
ING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, RATIFICATION
STATUS ASOFMARCH12, 2008 (2008), available athttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf.
29. See RUGGIE, supra note 16.
30. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5398, 1995) (“The oddity of
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resource-rich countries should benefit from an abundance of natural
resources, particularly resources such as oil or natural gas that are
consistently in great demand. Although there are exceptions, resources
have not proven to be a boon to resource-rich countries. Indeed, when
compared with other developing countries, those with resource-
dependent economies underperform.31 It is not only revenue from the
sale of natural resources that can have unexpectedly negative effects.
For many poor countries, official development assistance appears to do
much less good than expected, and can even reduce social welfare.32 In
previous writings, we have referred to such wealth transfers as “uncon-
ditioned wealth,”33 and argued that transfers of wealth without appro-
priate incentives and constraints to ensure that the wealth is used in
socially productive ways are unlikely to lead to sustained improvements
in the lives of ordinary people, regardless of whether the wealth arrives
in the form of resource revenue, development assistance, or quasi-
private investment.34 Put slightly differently, what matters for develop-
ment is not the nominal form of or justification for the wealth transfer
but the conditions associated with it. Without the discipline imposed by
an engaged and informed polity, the market, or other states, it is too
easy for recipient regimes to use wealth transfers to solidify their hold
on power at the expense of broad-based development.
A. Identifying the Constraints and Incentives that Matter Most
Why have infusions of wealth been so unhelpful to poor countries?
We argue that when wealth flows from one state to another or from
institutions to states, whether that wealth has a positive or negative
effect on citizens in the recipient state depends on the conditions
associated with the wealth. What we call unconditioned wealth refers to
transfers of funds or goods without accompanying conditions that
would otherwise create incentives for the recipient to use the wealth in
resource-poor economies outperforming resource-rich economies has been a recurring motif of
economic history.”).
31. See generally Ross, supra note 6 (summarizing the positive case demonstrating the
existence of the resource curse and analyzing possible causes).
32. See generally Simeon Djankov et al., The Curse of Aid, 13 J. ECON. GROWTH 169 (2008)
(surveying literature on the relationship between development assistance and institutional
quality, official corruption, economic growth, and other factors, and finding that dependence on
aid is negatively associated with institutions and governance).
33. See Keenan, supra note 13.
34. This argument is developed more fully in Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious
Finance: Avoiding the Externalities of a Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 14 HARV. INT’L L.J. 109 (2008).
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socially-beneficial ways.35 To be sure, previous transfers of wealth,
including conventional development assistance in the form of grants or
loans made at concessional rates, foreign direct investment in private
enterprises, or quasi-public joint ventures, come with conditions at-
tached. Many of the conditions are outcome-oriented, seeking goals
such as economic liberalization, democratization, predictability, regula-
tion, deregulation, or general improvement in social welfare. Some of
these goals have been lauded, while others have been widely discred-
ited; the history of such conditions, discussed briefly below, is decidedly
mixed.36
Our approach is different. We do not focus solely, or even primarily,
on conditions of this sort. Instead, we define conditions as the amalgam
of constraints and incentives associated with the wealth transfer, regard-
less of whether those constraints or incentives are formally denomi-
nated as such or merely the consequence of an infusion of wealth into a
particular set of political, social, and economic institutions. More
importantly, our approach is different because the recipients of the
wealth transfer and associated conditions will be private entrepreneurs—
not states.
1. The Descriptive Case: The Puzzling Ineffectiveness of Wealth
Transfers
It is by now commonplace to observe that economies heavily depen-
dent on resource wealth often do not advance as well as those without
similar resources. In one of the most influential studies in development
economics, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner analyzed the role
of natural resource wealth in economic development for a sample of 97
resource-rich economies.37 Sachs and Warner compared each coun-
try’s growth rate to its level of resource dependence, as indicated by the
ratio of resource-based exports to gross domestic product.38 Even after
controlling for a number of other variables, Sachs andWarner found “a
statistically significant, inverse, and robust association between natural
resource intensity and growth.”39 The work of Sachs and Warner,
35. See generally Keenan, supra note 13.
36. See IMF, CONDITIONALITY FACTSHEET (May 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/
facts/conditio.htm.
37. See Sachs & Warner, supra note 30, at 2, 49 fig.1 (noting a sample size of 97 developing
countries).
38. Id. at 2 (comparing “each country’s annual growth rate between 1970-89 in relation to the
country’s natural resource-based exports in 1970, measured as a percent of GDP”).
39. Id. at 21.
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amongothers, has created a burgeoning subfield of development econom-
ics devoted to documenting and analyzing this basic problem.40
Now commonly called the “resource curse,”41 this phenomenon was
initially seen as a version of the “Dutch disease,”42 a term used to
describe the macroeconomic effects on a domestic economy resulting
from the sale of natural resources.43 It turns out that the effects of the
resource curse are broader than simple currency value distortions or
other narrow macroeconomic results. These may include an increase
in official corruption,44 greater likelihood of conflict,45 misallocation
of resources,46 longer tenure for leaders of the ruling regime,47 and
40. A full survey of this vast literature is far beyond the scope of this Article. For thorough
surveys of the economic and political economic literature, see Ross, supra note 6 (reviewing
literature documenting and explaining the negative effect of natural resource wealth on eco-
nomic growth); Andrew Rosser, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey 13
(Inst. Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 268, 2006) (finding, after an extensive literature survey,
that “while there is strong evidence to support the notion of a resource curse, it is by no means
conclusive”). But see Michael Alexeev, The Curse of Aid, REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. (forthcoming
2010) (arguing that much of the literature on the resource curse reaches its conclusions on the
basis of bad models).
41. It appears that economist Richard M. Auty coined this phrase in his book SUSTAINING
DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE THESIS (1993). Auty sought to explain
why countries heavily dependent on the sale of certain minerals “have performed less well than
the developing countries as a whole.” Id. at 6. Although Auty’s focus was on “hard mineral
exporters” as opposed to “hydrocarbon producers,” id. at 3, the phrase “resource curse” has since
come to include economies dependent on oil as well as other extractable resources. See Ross, supra
note 6, at 298 (analyzing the ways that “minimally processed natural resources, including hard
rock minerals, petroleum, timber, and agricultural commodities, influence[] economic growth”).
42. This phrase originated in a 1997 article in the Economist contrasting the “external health
and internal ailments” of Holland’s economy. The Dutch Disease, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1977, at 82.
43. See PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 39-40 (2007) (describing the causes and consequences of the Dutch
disease).
44. Aaron Tornell & Phillip R. Lane, The Voracity Effect, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 23 (1999). Tornell
and Lane argue that where political and legal institutions are weak, unconditioned wealth can
produce “amore-than-proportional increase in redistribution” of wealth from resource rents. Id. at 42.
45. See generally Silje Aslaksen & Ragnar Torvik, A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in
Rentier States, 108 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 571, 584 (2006) (presenting empirical results showing
that greater “resource wealth increases the expected payoff from both elections and conflict”).
46. See, e.g., James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, White Elephants, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 197, 198
(2005) (describing decisions by the government of Zambia to place manufacturing plants in
locations that would ensure support from voters even though the locations were not served by
reliable transportation networks and alternative locations were available).
47. See Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999, 48
AM. J. POL. SCI. 232, 238 (2004) (finding that “[o]il dependence is a positive predictor of
durability, but at the same time is negatively related to democracy, another positive predictor”).
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reductions in various measures of social welfare.
Next, consider development assistance, which has also been much
less beneficial than might be expected, given the magnitude of the
assistance. The nominal objective of official development assistance is
to enhance social welfare in the recipient state. The metric by which
this goal has typically been measured is whether the assistance contrib-
uted to economic growth; by this measure development assistance does
not fare well. Even among economists who agree on little else, there is
broad agreement that development assistance has not produced posi-
tive results in most instances. For example, William Easterly, a promi-
nent skeptic of development assistance, has questioned whether there
has been any positive effect from aid as it has typically been conveyed.48
On this point—and perhaps only on this point—Easterly agrees with
David Dollar, who is much less skeptical of foreign assistance in
general, but who also notes that aid has had very little positive effect in
recipient countries.49 The problem is not merely that development
assistance has not been as effective as intended. Just as with resource
revenue, aid also appears to contribute to a reduction in social welfare
and an erosion of good governance.50 For example, foreign aid appears
to cause an increase in official corruption as politicians compete for the
control of the wealth.51 Aid dependence can also undermine the
quality of a country’s institutions of governance and erode democ-
racy.52 To be sure, there are examples of development projects that
have worked. Nonetheless, over the long-term, foreign aid has not
contributed to growth.53
48. See William Easterly et al., Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 774, 779
(2004) (finding data questioning whether development assistance has had any positive effects on
growth in recipient countries).
49. See, e.g., Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies and Growth, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 847,
848 (2000) (arguing that “on average aid has had little impact on growth, although a robust
finding was that aid has had a more positive impact on growth in good policy environments”).
50. See, e.g., Stephen Knack, Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country
Empirical Tests, 68 S. ECON. J. 310, 310 (2001) (presenting data showing that “higher aid levels
erode the quality of governance, as measured by indices of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and
the rule of law”).
51. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?,
92 AM. ECON. REV. 1126, 1127 (2002) (finding that “an increase in aid increases corruption”).
52. See Simeon Djankov et al., The Curse of Aid, 13 J. ECON. GROWTH 169, 170 (2008) (finding
that if “a country receives the average amount of aid over GDP over the whole period, then the
recipient country would have gone from the average level of democracy in recipient countries in
the initial year to a total absence of democratic institutions”).
53. See, e.g., Michael Clemens et al., Counting Chickens When They Hatch: The Short Term Effect of
Aid on Growth, 3, (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 40, 2004) (finding, after categorizing
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Just as resource revenue and development assistance do not necessar-
ily translate into economic development enjoyed by the populace,
private investment, like development assistance, does not necessarily
contribute to the economic development of poor countries. For de-
cades, researchers have demonstrated that foreign investment can act
as a net drain on the wealth of developing countries.54 Contrary to the
widely-held belief that FDI contributes to economic development,
empirical evidence demonstrating that FDI often slows growth contra-
dicts this common justification for FDI.55 This is particularly true in
poor countries56 where a minimum level of social capacity is required
for FDI to promote economic growth.57 In particular, private invest-
ment can diminish monetary gains in countries that rely heavily on the
extraction of natural resources and can degrade their long-term poten-
tial (in the form of retained natural-resources) for economic develop-
ment.58
Investor-state arrangements often contemplate that the investor will
remit funds to the state via taxes, fees, and profit-sharing payments.
However, firms regularly negotiate for long-term tax holidays, diminish
their obligations to pay fees, and share profits through complex
transfer-pricing arrangements. Such arrangements enable firms to
significantly demonstrate that a host-state-based subsidiary has earned
low profits (or even suffered losses) within the host-country while the
home-state-based firm shows significant profits arising from up-stream
re-pricing of the goods derived from the host-country.59 This pricing
architecture leaves investor host-states with significantly less economic
development assistance endeavors by where the aid was targeted and how it was used—emergency
aid, long-term aid, and short-term aid—that short-term aid is correlated with economic growth).
54. See, e.g., Peter Evans, National Autonomy and Economic Development: Critical Perspectives on
Multinational Corporations in Poor Countries, 25 INT’L ORG. 675, 678-80 (1971) (citing early studies
demonstrating countries such as India, Indonesia, and many in Latin America exported more
funds than they received of their surplus wealth during the nineteenth century).
55. See Stephen Kosack & Jennifer Tobin, Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of Aid,
FDI and Government in Economic Success, 60 INT’L ORG. 205 (2006).
56. Id.
57. Marta Bengoa & Blanca Sanchez-Robles, Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Freedom and
Growth: New Evidence from Latin America, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 529 (2003) (demonstrating that
variables related to social capacity, including the size of the host-country economy, its economic
climate, political stability, and public infrastructure, lead to a lack of social capacity in many poor
countries).
58. This argument is developed more fully in Christiana Ochoa, supra note 34.
59. See, e.g., GREENPEACE, CONNING THE CONGO: LOGGING SECTOR REVIEW (2008), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/conning-the-congo.pdf;
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growth than they might otherwise enjoy. FDI proponents may argue
that intangible values, such as technology and “know-how” are trans-
ferred via FDI. Even accounting for this value, FDI is not beneficial to
poor countries with low levels of social capacity.60
2. Some Causes and Consequences of Ineffective Wealth Transfers
The observation that unconditioned wealth has been ineffective or
counterproductive in many developing countries is an important initial
step in the analysis, but a determination of how and why unconditioned
wealth comes to be wasted or even causes harm is evenmore important.
Any policy designed to mitigate the harms from unconditioned wealth
must target the causal pathways through which such wealth works its
mischief. In this Part, we identify three possible causal mechanisms and
present the evidence supporting each hypothesis.61 We argue that
unconditioned wealth can cause behavioral, political, and institutional
distortions that can eliminate the beneficial effects of wealth and even
transform it into a source of harm. Our objective is to identify possible
points of intervention—spaces in the complicated intersection of re-
sources, institutions, individual behavior, financial markets, and the
like in which changes in policy might be most effective.
a. Behavioral Distortions: Rent-seeking
One explanation for the problems caused by unconditioned wealth
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA AND MITTAL STEEL HOLDINGS NV (2006), available
at http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/156/en/heavy_mittal.
60. Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, supra note 57, at 532.
61. There is a fourth potential causal mechanism that we do not consider in any detail. Many
economists have attributed the harms caused by unconditioned wealth to the Dutch Disease. On
this account, an increase in the price of a principal export—such as natural resource revenue—
causes real wages to increase and the real exchange rate to rise. These two effects combine to
reduce the competitiveness of those sectors of the economy not involved in the production or sale
of the resource. See generallyCOLLIER, supra note 43, at 39-40 (explaining the dynamics of the Dutch
Disease).
This account may well be true, but it ultimately begs the question of why countries continue to
pursue such policies in the face of evidence that these policies are unlikely to enhance welfare for
ordinary citizens or contribute to economic growth. We are, of course, not the first to notice this
conundrum; indeed, much of the political economic research on wealth and development has
been an attempt to explain it. See, e.g., Paul Stevens & Evelyn Dietsche, Resource Curse: An Analysis of
Causes, Experiences and Possible Ways Forward, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 56, 57 (2008) (arguing that in order
to explain the resource curse as a result of the “continuous[] fail[ure]” of many countries to
develop policies likely to avoid the Dutch Disease, economists and political scientists have
“identif[ied] why countries would deliberately pursue poor policies”).
THE HUMAN RIGHTS POTENTIAL OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
2009] 1165
is that when an individual perceives a short and sure way to become
wealthy, they follow it to the exclusion of other options. As this occurs,
the collective effect of their actions reduces the welfare in the country.
Put another way, rent-seeking amounts to “[c]utting yourself a bigger
slice of the cake rather than making the cake bigger.”62
b. Political Distortions: Rentier Effects
When politicians in power can depend on revenue from the sale of a
natural resource to fund their regime and the institutions of govern-
ment, they are relieved of the need to make the politically difficult
choices that might support broad-based economic development. For
example, when a ruling regime can fund itself by selling natural
resources, “the state has less need for taxation of the population, and
without the pressure for taxation the state has less need to develop
mechanisms of deep control of the citizenry.”63 In addition, a ruling
regime can use unconditioned wealth to support politically-useful but
economically-unsound investments.64 In Nigeria, for example, to pla-
cate its supporters, the government has invested heavily in manufactur-
ing. Unfortunately, those investments have contributed little to eco-
nomic growth because the true objective of the government was
political, not economic. According to one recent empirical study of
Nigeria, “two-thirds of the investment in manufacturing by the govern-
ment is consistently wasted.”65
c. Institutional Distortions
When politicians manage assets with only political objectives in
mind, they can make very bad investment decisions. In perhaps the
most complete account of this phenomenon, Michael Ross has demon-
strated how politicians in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were
motivated by the rents available from timber sales to undermine
62. MATTHEW BISHOP, ESSENTIAL ECONOMICS 225 (2004).
63. Jonathan Isham et al., The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures
and the Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 141, 147 (2005).
64. See, e.g., Ivar Kolstad et al.,Mission Improbable: Does Petroleum-Related Aid Address the Resource
Curse?, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 954, 955 (2009) (arguing that “increased natural resource rents offer
governments both more opportunities and greater incentives to pay off political supporters to stay
in power”).
65. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An
Illustration from Nigeria 13 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9804, 2003).
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national and local institutions in order to exploit the timber.66 Simi-
larly, a recent report has illustrated this phenomenon among Cambo-
dia’s ruling elite.67
II. PROPOSAL: A MULTILATERAL SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT AGENCY
We propose the creation of a new entity within the existing World
Bank Group, to be called theMultilateral Sovereign Investment Agency,
which would receive investments from sovereign wealth funds and use
those funds to invest in small- and medium-scale private enterprises in
Africa. The principal objective of MSIA would be to facilitate invest-
ment by sovereign funds in those private sector investments most likely
to alleviate poverty and contribute to economic growth in the poorest
countries. It would attempt to accomplish this goal by identifying
for-profit private sector investment opportunities in developing coun-
tries and taking equity stakes in those enterprises. In addition to
managing investor funds, MSIA would serve as a source of information
on investment opportunities in developing countries, encouraging
compliance with socially-responsible investment principles, and supply-
ing expertise to private enterprises seeking outside investors.
In broad terms, the proposed MSIA would exist as a fund to manage
investments from sovereign funds seeking equity investments in private
enterprises. In its operations, the MSIA would resemble a venture
capital fund, which manages money from investors seeking potentially
significant returns from equity stakes in start-up companies and willing
to accept correspondingly higher levels of risk. Venture capital funds
are a useful analogy because they often take direct equity stakes in
enterprises as opposed to merely purchasing securities, bonds, or other
market-traded assets, and they often have a greater degree of interac-
tion with the target enterprise than would an ordinary investor, for
example, one who purchased securities.68
A. The Venture Capital Model
Venture capital plays a vital role in the economies of developed
countries, and an increasingly important role in developing countries.
Indeed, Ronald Gilson, a leading American scholar of venture capital,
66. See generallyMICHAEL L. ROSS, TIMBER BOOMS AND INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA (2001).
67. GLOBAL WITNESS, COUNTRY FOR SALE (2009) (describing the kleptocratic management of
Cambodia’s public assets, including its natural resources).
68. Microenterprise also serves as a useful analogue and will be discussed below.
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suggests that “creating a venture capital market has become the holy
grail of economic development.”69 Our proposal is not an attempt to
design a full-fledged venture capital market.70 Instead, we draw on
insights from the important role played by venture capital and venture
capital firms in economic development and the advancement of social
welfare as a way to identify the role the MSIA should play in Africa.
Venture capital is a form of financing used to support new or
growing companies.71 The use of venture capital is commonly associ-
ated with early-stage businesses “that have great financial needs and
great risks involved, but . . . also have a high potential for growth and
hence for potentially large profits.”72 Venture capital firms are enter-
prises that use funds received from outsiders to invest in entrepreneur-
ial ventures.73 The structure of an efficient venture capital market—the
web of contracts connecting outside investors, fund managers, and
entrepreneurs—is a vivid example of the importance of linking good
ideas, capital, and skilled managers.
This market, with its many complexities, has inspired close attention
from academics and policymakers alike, but we focus here on three
principal features.74 First, venture capital firms are important to eco-
nomic development because they play an important sorting role by
identifying innovative or promising ideas and supporting the best of
those ideas. In this way, those innovations most likely to be socially
useful have the opportunity to develop and reach a market. Second,
venture capital firms typically work closely with the enterprises in which
they invest and provide vital advice about management, marketing,
financing, and the like. Many venture capital funds operate as quasi-
69. Ronald J. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1068.
70. Scholars and policymakers have attempted to design venture capital markets (or theories
to support a design). See, e.g., Marco Da Rin et al., Public Policy and the Creation of Active Venture
Capital Markets, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1699 (2006).
71. See, e.g., BISHOP, supra note 62, at 270.
72. Dirk Engel & Max Keilbach, Firm-Level Implications of Early Stage Venture Capital Invest-
ment—An Empirical Investigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 150, 151 (2007).
73. See, e.g., William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 473 (1990) (defining venture capital as “a professionally managed pool of
capital that is invested in equity-linked securities of private ventures at various stages in their
development”).
74. In addition to those we discuss in detail, there is a fourth function that venture capital
firms perform. Venture capital firms support endeavors that might not otherwise receive financ-
ing. As obvious as this might seem, the role of venture capital as capital is critical, particularly in
poor countries, and especially with respect to highly innovative and risky ventures. See, e.g.,
Robert D. Cooter, 2005 Mason Ladd Lecture: Information, Innovation, and the Poverty of Nations, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373 (2005).
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management consulting firms, at least with respect to the recipients of
their investment. This transfer of knowledge is difficult to quantify but
can be fundamental to the success or failure of a start-up firm. Finally,
venture capital firms, for reasons we explain below, can act as quasi-
watchdogs within new or growing enterprises. We devote the remain-
der of this Part to an analysis of how the venture capital model
accomplishes each of these important functions. In the next Part, we
show how the MSIA might be structured to perform similar functions.
1. Searching and Sorting
In the parlance of the venture capital world, one of the principal
objectives of a venture capital firm is “deal flow.”75 This requires the
identification of entrepreneurs with innovative ideas and small enter-
prises with highly promising business plans. VC firms must possess (or
hire) the technical skills to evaluate the quality of, and potential market
for, an entrepreneur’s ideas. For example, to find and evaluate the best
ideas at the earliest possible stage, VC firms send representatives to
conferences,76 locate themselves nearby to universities and university-
related research parks,77 and employ their own in-house specialists to
evaluate proposals.78 All of these examples require the financier to
possess expertise in substantive fields, as opposed to merely possessing
financial expertise (important though it may be). Additionally, VC
financiers must be proactive in seeking investment opportunities rather
than passively waiting for potential customers to find them. To be clear,
we do not argue that VC firms never receive unsolicited requests for
assistance; indeed, VC firms receive thousands of pitches every year.
Instead, we argue that the most successful VC firms seek ideas, rather
than wait for ideas to come to them. While we recognize that some of
the venues VC firms typically use for access to good ideas (e.g. high-
level conferences and well-funded universities) may not exist in many
African states, individuals from those states often attend conferences
75. See, e.g., Yael V. Hochberg et al., Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and
Investment Performance, 62 J. FIN. 251, 252 (2007) (defining “deal flow” as the ability to “select
promising companies” and stating that it is “one of the twomain drivers of a” venture capital firm’s
performance).
76. See, e.g., Rich Mintzer, Where Ideas Meet Investors, MSNBC, Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/29550643/.
77. See, e.g., Albert N. Link & John T. Scott, The Economics of University Research Parks,
23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 661 (2007).
78. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Clusters and the New Economics of Competition, 76 HARV. BUS. REV.
77 (1998).
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and attain schooling abroad. These individuals would form self-
selected talent-pools from which the MSIA would draw.
2. Management Assistance
Venture capital firms typically invest in very early stage enterprises.
When a venture capital firm invests in a start-up, it usually takes an
active role in managing the enterprise.79 This involvement can take a
variety of forms. For example, VC firms commonly place a member of
the VC firm on the start-up’s board of directors. For earlier-stage
enterprises, the VC firm’s involvement might entail providing regular
advice or assistance regarding accounting, marketing, or any number
of other issues relating to the commercialization of the entrepreneur’s
idea.80 Regardless of the specific issues on which assistance is provided,
two considerations are important. First, the VC firm’s assistance is
tailored to the specific needs of the new enterprise. It is flexible and
responsive to the challenges and deficits faced by that enterprise, which
can vary over time and among firms. Second, because their fates are
intertwined, the VC firm has the same incentives as the new enter-
prise.81 Thus, the new enterprise should be receptive to the VC firm’s
advice. This is not to suggest that no conflict is possible or that the
investor’s interests do not diverge from the enterprise’s interests over
the long-term. Both are possible. However, what matters is that, in most
instances, the VC firm and the new enterprise will define success in the
same way.
3. Oversight
Entrepreneurs wishing to develop their ideas into businesses can
seek financing from banks or venture capital funds.82 The entrepre-
neur’s financing decision is significant to the future success or failure
79. See, e.g., Michael Gorman & William A. Sahlman, What do Venture Capitalists Do?, 4 J. BUS.
VENTURING 231 (1989).
80. See, e.g., Dimo P. Dimov & Dean A. Shepherd, Human Capital Theory and Venture Capital
Firms: Exploring “Home Runs” and “Strike Outs,” 20 J. BUS. VENTURING 1, 4-5 (2005) (identifying the
various management-related tasks performed by venture capitalists for their portfolio companies).
81. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 17, at 1072 (noting that venture capital funds are “expected to
make important noncash contributions to the portfolio company . . . [including] management
assistance, . . . [and] intensive monitoring of the portfolio company’s performance”).
82. Many early-stage entrepreneurs also receive financial capital from what some call the
three F’s: “family, friends, and fools.” Robert D. Cooter, Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of
Nations, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 377 (2005). Although such financing is surely important, we do
not consider it here.
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of the new business. Bank financing is typically in the form of debt and
thus requires an obligation to repay the funds.83 In VC contracts, VC
firms typically receive some form of equity in exchange for financial
capital.84 There are myriad implications that flow from this differ-
ence,85 but we focus on one area in particular: an equity stake typically
provides greater incentives and greater opportunities to ensure that
the new enterprise is managed competently and complies with the
law.86 By embedding itself in the new enterprise, the VC firm is
positioned to know and influence the decisions made by the manag-
ers.87 This is certainly no guarantee that the new enterprise will never
violate the law or o therwise engage in unethical behavior. However,
the VC firm’s equity stake compels deep concern for the long-term
health and value of the new enterprise.
B. Reasons the MSIA Would Be Better Than Likely Alternatives
Our proposal is a tool to facilitate state, investor, and international
organizational mitigation of the harms caused by wealth transfers to
countries that lack the social capacity necessary to ensure that such
transfers result in economic growth. In the remainder of this Part, we
show why our proposal is a good means to accomplish these goals.
Before demonstrating ways that our approach might be preferable, it is
useful to suggest how our model will differ from the likely IFC ap-
proach. The IFC has not yet publicly released any details about the
form of its new endeavor. However, by way of speculation, two features
of the IFC’s prior work are most important. First, despite its focus on
private sector investments, the IFC nonetheless must work with host
country governments; indeed, its charter requires it to forego any
83. See Masako Ueda, Banks Versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and Expropria-
tion, 59 J. FIN. 601, 601 (2004) (describing choice of financing).
84. See AndrewWinton & Vijay Yerramilli, Entrepreneurial Finance: Banks Versus Venture Capital,
88 J. FIN. ECON. 51 (2008).
85. For a useful summary of the literature regarding the differences between debt and equity
financing, see id. at 52.
86. See, e.g., Ueda, supra note 83, at 601-02 & n.1 (summarizing literature indicating that,
when compared to bankers, venture capitalists possess “the technical knowledge about the
industries in which a venture capitalist has been investing,” permitting them to better evaluate and
manage firms in that industry).
87. For a survey of the literature demonstrating that venture capital firms engage more
actively and frequently with their investees than do banks, see Winton & Yerramilli, supra 84, at 52
& n.2 (noting, for example, that venture capitalists monitor their investment enterprises an
average of 18.7 times per year, while banks monitor their lending recipient firms an average of one
or two times per year).
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project to which the host country government objects.88 This restric-
tion, while perhaps appropriate given the large-scale infrastructure
projects the IFC often supports, would unduly restrict the options
available to local entrepreneurs and enterprises and place too much
power in the hands of the host country governments. Our model
bypasses the government and provides financial capital directly to
enterprises, thereby reducing the opportunity for government interfer-
ence and reducing the incentives for patronage-related corruption.
Second, the IFC typically invests in large-scale projects. Our model
targets small- and medium-sized enterprises. The recent history of
development policy is rife with failed approaches, but microfinance is
one of the few bright spots. For reasons we suggest below, investment in
smaller enterprises appears to do more good, at a lower cost, than the
large-scale projects often pursued by international financial institu-
tions.
1. Direct Engagement with Private Enterprises
Over the past two or three decades, the World Bank and other
international development and financial institutions have increasingly
turned their attention to the quality of institutions in beneficiary
countries.89 Other things equal, a country with stronger institutions is
likely to see greater and more durable improvements in economic
conditions and social welfare than a country with weaker institutions.90
On this account, institutions appear to play two important roles: they
reduce the opportunities and incentives for political corruption and
they help to create the conditions for individuals and communities to
set and enforce norms and facilitate economic activity.91 Put slightly
differently, political accountability and civil society institutions help to
ensure that political leaders are sensitive to ordinary people and help to
88. See IFC, Articles of Agreement, art. III, § 3(ii), Apr. 28, 1993, available at http://www.ifc.org/
ifcext/about.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/articles.pdf/$FILE/articles.pdf (“[The IFC] shall not fi-
nance an enterprise in the territories of any member if the member objects to such financing.”).
89. See Deborah Brautigam, Governance and Economy: A Review (World Bank, Policy & Review
Dep’t, Working Paper No. 815, 1991), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1991/12/01/000009265_3961002050636/Rendered/
PDF/multi0page.pdf.
90. See, e.g., Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, FINANCE &
DEVELOPMENT 7 (1998).
91. See, e.g., Daniel Kaufmann, Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy,
(World Bank, Discussion Draft, March 11, 2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/rethink_gov_stanford.pdf.
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provide the platform for individual initiative to increase social welfare.
The conventional approach to development assistance has come to
include measures to improve both kinds of institutions.92 What unites
these efforts, and is generally true of the conventional approach to
development and institutions, is the direct engagement of the problem
institutions in an attempt to improve them.
Our approach is different. We propose that the MSIA invest directly
in private enterprises irrespective of the host country’s relationship
with the IFC or the World Bank. This would reduce the likelihood that
a ruling regime could stand in the way of an investment that might, for
example, enhance social welfare but also strengthen its political oppo-
nents. By bypassing, or at least reducing, state involvement, our pro-
posal would provide more opportunity for enterprises to develop in
ways that were responsive to local concerns and needs rather than
merely useful for the ruling regime. This would certainly not guarantee
the success of every new enterprise or ensure that new enterprises would
never engage in socially-harmful activities. But, our approach would
help to enhance the vitality of communities and small-scale entrepre-
neurs as opposed to providing yet another revenue stream for states.
Our approach has an additional benefit, which is perhaps best
understood in the context of the venture capital model. Recall that this
model has the ability, along with both the expertise and incentive, to
ensure that the new enterprise complies with the laws and good
business practices because the venture capital firms is embedded in the
new enterprise. This salutary feature of the venture capital model
would provide no guarantees, but it would help increase the enter-
prise’s likelihood of success (and long-run value). And, perhaps most
important, it might help forestall a host country’s sovereignty-based
objection that the MSIA was attempting to meddle in local matters.
Because the MSIA’s investment would be valuable only if the enterprise
succeeded, and because success would depend on largely local condi-
tions, the MSIA would have every incentive to help the recipients of its
investments comply with local laws and be responsive to local demands.
2. Leveraging the World Bank Group’s Strengths
One useful feature of the venture capital model is that it shows the
importance of actively seeking investment opportunities rather than
passively awaiting requests for assistance. One component of this feature is
the need for the investor to possess substantial expertise in the techni-
92. See Brautigam, supra note 89.
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cal issues most important to the new enterprise’s business plan. Our
MSIA proposal would have the capacity to do both of these things. First,
because the World Bank Group in general and the IFC in particular
already possess substantial expertise in Africa’s private sector, the MSIA
would be in a good position to identify good investments from its
inception (and have the ability to attract more talent as well). Second,
the IFC already provides services akin to management consulting and
has developed substantial expertise in this area. What sets our ap-
proach apart from the IFC’s typical approach is the MSIA would use
this expertise on behalf of smaller enterprises. These enterprises are
most likely to succeed, most likely to actually enhance social welfare,
and least likely to contribute to the state-level corruption issues that are
so prevalent in Africa.
3. The Potential of Micro- and Meso-Finance
The IFC has, for much of its history, invested primarily in large-scale
projects. The history of such investments is decidedly mixed. Recently,
the IFC has begun to show more flexibility in its investments. For
example, it now has a program that specifically targets, and provides
management and marketing assistance, to smaller enterprises.93 Our
approach with the MSIA is to hasten and enhance the move toward
smaller enterprises. Instead of encouraging or suggesting engagement
with smaller enterprises, the MSIA would be charged with identifying
small- and medium-sized businesses and new entrepreneurs for invest-
ment. This approach, while again not providing a guarantee of success,
would be consistent with the best available evidence, which shows that
micro- and meso-finance are two of the very few development models
that actually appear to be helpful to local people.94
III. POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
This concept and the institutional design features we have suggested
naturally raise a host of issues and potential objections. In this Part, we
anticipate and respond to three of these issues. One possible objection to
93. See IFC, CREATING OPPORTUNITIES IN EMERGING MARKETS: MICROFINANCE (2008), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/gfm.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/M-Trifolds/$FILE/M-Trifolds.pdf.
94. See, e.g., Robert Cull et al., Microfinance Meets the Market, (World Bank Dev. Research Group,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4630, 2008), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/05/27/000158349_20080527095250/Rendered/
PDF/wps4630.pdf (describing the history of microfinance and its contributions to economic
development).
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our proposal is that it is conditionality dressed in new clothing. Our
response is that we are not advocating the kind of conditionality im-
posed by the IMF in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Instead, we advocate the
creation of tools that would permit political or market conditions to
discipline investors and states alike. A second potential objection is that
our proposal is a call for a return to the days when African states were
dominated by foreign corporations. In light of the history of foreign
involvement inAfrica, we take this concern seriously, but we argue that our
proposal simply does not do this. Instead of being transfers of power from
states to foreign corporations, it would actually amount to transfers of
power from ruling regimes to citizens, by providing citizens with a path to
prosperity that did not depend on the state. The final objection we
anticipate is that our proposal is simply impractical. Even if Robert Zoellick
wants sovereign funds to invest in Africa, they will not do so unless those
investments are likely to generate a solid return. We argue that our
institutional design, along with a handful of features of the market for
capital in Africa, make our approach at least plausible. Other complica-
tions are sure to arise, but they must be left for another day.95
A. Conditionality and Market Discipline
Transfers of funds to developing countries—whether in the form of
loans, grants, or financial investments—have often come with condi-
tions attached. For example, during the Cold War, much of the aid that
flowed from the United States or the former Soviet Union was designed
to shape the behavior of the recipient state to ensure that it was
consistent with the donor’s strategic interests. After the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the United States faced less strategic competition, and its
aid became less focused on narrow security considerations and more
on broader efforts at promoting democracy.96 Similarly, assistance
from international institutions, including the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, has come with conditions on recipient-
95. One example might be that theMSIA, limited as it would be to 1% of sovereign funds, could
actually reduce the amount of capital from SWF’s invested in Africa. Such concerns might have
relatively simple solutions. For example, theMSIA couldmanage no less than x amount of funds, with
x being the amount of sovereign wealth invested in Africa at the date of theMSIA’s establishment.
96. See, e.g., James Meernik et al., Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and
After the Cold War, 60 J. POL. 63, 64 (1998) (concluding, based on empirical analysis of U.S. foreign
aid allocations, that “security-driven goals have become less critical and ideological goals more
important with the passing of the Cold War. . . . [T]he United States is increasingly rewarding
democratic states with foreign aid while reducing assistance to strategically important nations.”).
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countries that have long been criticized.97 Having recognized that their
assistance has not been as effective as expected, the World Bank and
IMF have both undergone significant reforms with respect to the
content and form of conditionality.98 Conditionality reforms at both
institutions now call for fewer and better justified conditions that are
more narrowly-tailored and appropriate for the recipient country.99
Putting to one side the substance of the conditions associated with
foreign aid, what is important is that well-developed conditions are a
critical tandem with aid if wealth transfers are to be effective.
Beyond the involvement of other states, market discipline imposes
another set of potential conditions on investments and can come in a
variety of forms. For example, when a corporation decides to invest in a
foreign asset, it might insist on explicit assurances from the host country
that it will do nothing to undermine the value of the investment. This
might take the form of acceding to a bi-lateral investment treaty with the
investor’s home state, promising preferential tax status, or including
stabilization clauses in investor-state contracts.
Another kind of market condition is less explicit but more powerful.
The kind of business climate a state fosters goes a long way toward
determining whether investors wish to risk their capital in that state. Put
another way, the desire to attract investment, and to determine the kinds
of investments it attracts, can influence state policies in powerful ways.100
97. The World Bank and IMF have been criticized for their cumbersome conditions.
Generally speaking, criticism has come in three areas: (1) for requiring particular economic
policies that may not be beneficial to the receiving country (e.g. requiring the privatization of a
well-run public sector); (2) for being overly specific; and (3) for the sheer quantity and complexity
of conditions associated with loans and development assistance. For an extended discussion of
these issues, seeWILLIAM EASTERLY, WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST
HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD 6-30 (2006).
98. Shantayanan Devarajan et al., Overview, in AID AND REFORM IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM
TEN CASE STUDIES 6, 24-27 (Shantayanan Devarajan et al. eds., 2001) (affirming the irregular
correlation between economic policy conditions and effective use of funds and advocating for
country-owned development strategies).
99. Both institutions have on-going programs aimed at addressing these critiques. SeeWORLD
BANK, CONDITIONALITY IN DEVELOPMENT LENDING POLICY (2007), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1114615847489/Conditionalityfinalreport120407.pdf
(reporting on the World Bank’s progress on their Good Practice Principles for conditionality in
development policy lending); IMF, GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY (2002), available at http://
www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf (outlining the IMF’s Guidelines
on Conditionality, which were the result of significant criticism of the IMF’s conditionality
practices).
100. For a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which a state’s desire to attract commercial
activity can influence its policies, see generally WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2009: COMPARING
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A third variety of market conditions are those imposed by consumers
and interest groups.Many consumers are sensitive to corporations’ reputa-
tions for social responsibility, respect for the environment, or similar
concerns.101 With the exception of this last category, market conditions
have typically been profit-oriented and, until recently, have precluded
thorough consideration of the long-term benefits of the transparency,
anti-corruption, and policy conditions we suggest for theMSIA.
Our proposal would bring to bear a range of constraints and incen-
tives that would, taken together, increase the likelihood that invest-
ments in poor states actually benefit the citizens of those states. To be
clear, we do not argue that corporations or other states should deter-
mine the social policy of the states that receive aid or are the targets of
investments. Instead, in contrast to those who argue that aid is either
positive or negative, or that resource revenue is either positive or
negative, we argue that the principal determinants of whether wealth
will have a positive or negative effect may be the character of the
recipient and the conditions associated with the wealth. In our view,
resource revenue can (and does), in the right policy and institutional
environment, benefit citizens. Development assistance can (and does)
benefit recipients under the right conditions. Private investment can
(and does) benefit target states under the appropriate conditions. Our
aim is to create those conditions.
B. Corporations in Africa
The history of corporate involvement in Africa is rife with stories of
abuse and exploitation. From the devastating effects of the unspeak-
able horrors of the slave trade102 to the parastatal enterprises devel-
oped during the colonial years,103 examples abound of the ways that
corporate activity made life worse for ordinary people in many states in
Africa. And the recent history of corporate activity in Africa shows that
REGULATION IN 181 ECONOMIES (2009), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/
FullReport/2009/DB_2009_English.pdf.
101. See, e.g., Paul A. Argenti & Bob Druckenmiller, Reputation and Corporate Brand, 6 CORP.
REPUTATION REV. 368, 372-73 (2004) (presenting results of qualitative empirical research suggest-
ing that corporate managers seek to create socially responsible identities for their brands); Jill
Gabrielle Klein et al., Why We Boycott: Consumer Motivations for Boycott Participation, 68 J. MARKETING
92, 93-95 (2004) (surveying research findings suggesting reasons for consumer boycotts).
102. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE (1988).
103. See RALPH AUSTEN, AFRICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 122-46 (1987) (describing the role of
corporations in creating quasi-states within Africa and the effects of this transformation on local
people and economies).
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the old problems remain.104 Despite the continued importance of this
history, we argue that there are two responses to these concerns. First,
corporate activity continues in Africa and will certainly continue in the
future. Our aim is to make it more likely to actually benefit local people
and communities, mindful that it will never be without problems. Many
of the worst abuses relating to corporate activity in Africa came about
through collusion between foreign corporations and the state (or the
colonial power). Our approach is a way to permit citizens to form
partnerships with the MSIA, thereby circumventing the state, which has
all too often facilitated the harm caused by corporations. Second, the
conditions under which many of the worst abuses occurred have
changed, making them less likely today.105 To be clear, we do not argue
abuse is impossible, or even particularly unlikely. Instead, we maintain
that our proposal is more likely to do good and less likely to do harm
than the available alternatives.
C. Plausibility Concerns
A final set of objections to our proposal is that it is implausible. This
objection could take many forms, but we focus here on two: sovereign
fund managers will not participate in the MSIA, unless its returns are
equal to the returns available elsewhere, and states will object because
channeling their investments through the MSIA would remove the
strategic benefits they receive from their commercial decisions. In our
approach, we consider sovereign fund managers to be separate from
sovereign fund owners (which are states). This distinction supports the
assumption that sovereign fundmanagers are motivated by returns, not
by strategic issues, and that there is some room for states to incorporate
strategic considerations in their commercial decisions.
We argue that sovereign fund managers will likely view the MSIA
favorably for three principal reasons. First, the MSIA would certainly
not foreclose other investment opportunities. Recall that Zoellick
called for sovereign funds to invest only 1% of their assets in the
as-yet-unnamed project. Thus, sovereign fund managers need not
choose the MSIA over other options, but merely incorporate it as a
small portion of an array of investments in a diversified portfolio.
Second, all investors benefit from greater transparency and consistent
104. See JOHN GHAZVINIAN, UNTAPPED: THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA’S OIL (2007); HOWARD W.
FRENCH, A CONTINENT FOR THE TAKING: THE TRAGEDY AND HOPE OF AFRICA (2004).
105. See Patrick J. Keenan, Do Norms Still Matter? The Corrosive Effects of Globalization on the
Vitality of Norms, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 327 (2008).
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investment conditions. For example, it would be virtually impossible
for an investor to appropriately value a possible investment if that
investor does not know whether she will be subject to taxes that were
the same, higher, or lower than others in the same market. The MSIA
could help provide more information and transparency by embedding
itself—and the transparency and anti-corruption practices required of
World Bank Group projects—into the private sector in Africa at the
local level. Finally, some investors may actually prefer the MSIA,
particularly in difficult or fragile investment climates. If the MSIA were
a partner in a multi-partner project, or if it were the conduit through
which the sovereign fund invested, then the MSIA could play the
important role of negotiating with the state if it were to attempt to
solicit bribes or otherwise undermine the new enterprise. The presence
of an institutional investor, particularly one that is part of the World
Bank Group, might assuage some investors’ concerns about how they
would effectively engage with the host country government.
IV. CONCLUSION
Robert Zoellick’s call for sovereign wealth funds to invest in Africa
has the potential to mark the start of a new era of investment in Africa.
Whether this investment improves the lives of ordinary people in Africa
depends in large part on how the investments are structured and who
receives them. We propose the formation of a new branch of the World
Bank Group, which we have called the Multilateral Sovereign Invest-
ment Agency. The MSIA could receive investments from sovereign
wealth funds and use those funds to invest in small- and medium-scale
private enterprises in Africa. If structured appropriately, the MSIA
could help ensure that investments in Africa actually, and finally,
benefit ordinary people.
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